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People v. Roth: Should Physicians Be
Exempt from New York Antitrust Law?
I. Introduction
In People v. Roth," the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
a decisions which gave physicians a blanket exemption from
New York's principal antitrust law, the Donnelly Act.3 In two
prior cases 4 however, the same court recognized the principle of
counterpart conformity 5 which requires the New York courts to
interpret the Donnelly Act consistently with federal court inter-
pretations of the Sherman Act,O the principal federal antitrust
law. Since the Sherman Act, as interpreted by the courts, offers
no blanket exemption to physicians and other learned profes-
sionals,7 the Roth court completely ignored its prior decisions re-
quiring consistent interpretations.
In Roth,8 eight physicians and their medical association
were charged with a combination in restraint of the furnishing of
services, in violation of the Donnelly Act which prohibits "com-
bination(s) [of trade] whereby... [clompetition or the free exer-
cise of any activity in the conduct of any business, trade or com-
merce or in the furnishing of any service ... is or may be
restrained ... ."0 It was alleged that the defendant physicians
1. 52 N.Y.2d 440, 420 N.E.2d 929, 438 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1981).
2. People v. Roth, 100 Misc. 2d 542, 419 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Nassau County Ct. 1979),
affld, 74 A.D.2d 1008, 425 N.Y.S.2d 904 (2d Dep't 1980), aff d, 52 N.Y.2d 440,420 N.E.2d
929, 438 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1981).
3. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 340-47 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1981). Sections 344 and
346 were repealed in 1933. 1933 N.Y. Laws ch. 804, §§ 3, 5.
4. State v. Mobil Oil Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 460, 344 N.E.2d 357, 381 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1976)
and Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289
N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
5. Counterpart conformity is the principle whereby New York courts interpret the
Donnelly Act in agreement with federal court interpretations of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 41-46.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). "
7. See infra notes 31, 33 and text accompanying notes 34-37.
8. People v. Roth, 100 Misc. 2d 542, 419 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Nassau County Ct. 1979).
9. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340(1) (McKinney 1968).
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violated the Act by refusing to provide professional services to
nonemergency workers' compensation and no-fault insurance pa-
tients.10 The trial court, the appellate division, 2 and the court
of appeals 3 all ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that the
medical profession is exempt from the Donnelly Act.
In ruling for the defendants, all three courts relied exclu-
sively on In re Freeman.14 In that case it was urged that a
County Bar Association's minimum fee schedule fixed the fee
level for legal services in that county and thus violated the Don-
nelly Act.15 In holding that the law is a profession, not a busi-
ness or trade regulated by the Donnelly Act, the Freeman court
announced a broad learned professions exemption from liability
under the Act. 6 The Roth court and the two lower courts viewed
the exemption announced in Freeman as absolute, and granted
the medical profession a blanket exemption.
Part II of this note examines the development of the
learned professions exemption from liability under both federal
and New York antitrust law. Part Il states the legislative and
judicial underpinnings of the principle of counterpart conform-
ity. Part IV presents the factual background of the Roth case.
Part V sets forth the reasoning of the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Roth, and Part VI critically analyzes this reasoning. The
note concludes that Roth was erroneously decided due to the
Roth court's refusal to use counterpart conformity and its failure
to view the learned professions exemption announced in Free-
man as a limited exemption.
10. People v. Roth, 100 Misc. 2d at 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
11. Id. at 547, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
12. People v. Roth, 74 A.D.2d 1008, 425 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1980).
13. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 447, 420 N.E.2d at 930, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
14. 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974).
15. Id. at 5, 311 N.E.2d at 482, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 337. By fixing the fee level, fee
competition would be eliminated; thus it would be a restraint on competition. The Free-
man court, however, stated that since the practice of law is a profession, it is not in-
cluded within the terms "business or trade" as used in the Donnelly Act's prohibition of
restraints on competition in the conduct of business, trade, or commerce. Id. at 8-9, 311
N.E.2d at 483-44, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
16. See infra note 27 and accompanying text
17. See. supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 2:273
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II. Context of the Learned Professions Exemption
The Sherman Act was passed in 1890.18 Its purpose is to
destroy combinations of trade designed to stifle competition.19
The Act does not expressly exempt any profession. The federal
courts, however, have formulated a learned professions exemp-
tion based on dicta from several cases.20 These cases suggest that
the practice of a learned profession2 1 is not "trade or commerce"
under the Act;2 2 therefore, members of the learned professions
do not fit the language of section one2 3 and are exempt from
liability under it.
The Donnelly Act was enacted in 1899.24 Its purpose is to
promote free and open competition in commerce and industry.2 5
Like the Sherman Act, the Donnelly Act does not expressly ex-
18. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1976)).
19. Senator Sherman, the sponsor of the bill which eventually became the Sherman
Antitrust Act, gave a speech explaining the bill's political and legal theory before the
Senate on March 21, 1890. In that speech, Sherman stated: "This bill... [seeks] ... only
to prevent and control combinations made with a view to prevent competition, or. for the
restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer."
21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890).
20. E.g., United States v. National Assoc. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 490-
91 (1950) (dicta) ("[w]herever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for
the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned
professions, it is constantly called a trade.") (quoting The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507
(C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388)) (emphasis added); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam
Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (dicta) ("medical practitioners... follow a profession and
not a trade. . . ."); Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (dicta) ("a firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case
... does not engage in... commerce because the lawyer ... goes to another State.").
Thus, the Supreme Court has distinguished a profession from a trade.
21. The classical definition of "learned professions" encompasses only the three dis-
ciplines of theology, law, and medicine. Herndon, Competition Policy and the Profes-
sions, 48 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. J. 1533, 1533 (1980). Nevertheless, the term "learned pro-
fessions" has evolved to include accountants, engineers, pharmacists, and others. Id.
22. Section one of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)
(emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. 1899 N.Y. Laws ch. 690, §§ 1-7 (current version at N.Y. GRN. Bus. LAw §§ 340-
47 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1981)).
25. See generally La Torella, New York's Donnelly Antitrust Act -Its Origins, En-
forcement and Future Development, 21 N.Y.L.F. 167, 167-74 (1975) (for a discussion of
the purpose of the Donnelly Act).
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empt any profession. In the case of In re Freeman,26 however,
the New York Court of Appeals announced a broad learned pro-
fessions exemption from liability under the Donnelly Act.2 7
It was not until Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar28 that the
federal courts addressed the issue whether the practice of a
learned profession fell within section one of the Sherman Act. In
Goldfarb, the petitioner clients argued that a County Bar Asso-
ciation's minimum fee schedule for real estate title examinations
violated section one of the Sherman Act. 9 The Supreme Court
held for the petitioners.8" The net result of Goldfarb was that
the Court explicitly rejected a total exemption from antitrust
26. 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974).
27. The specific holding in Freeman was that the Donnelly Act does not apply to
the legal profession; however, the court in Freeman implied that its holding covered the
learned professions in general. In considering the issue whether the legal profession is a
business or trade as that term is used in the Donnelly Act, the Freeman court noted:
A profession is not a business. It is distinguished by the requirements of ex-
tensive formal training and learning, admission to practice by a qualifying licen-
sure, a code of ethics imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond
those that prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace, a system for discipline of its
members for violation of the code of ethics, a duty to subordinate financial reward
to social responsibility, and, notably, an obligation on its members, even in non-
professional matters, to conduct themselves as members of a learned, disciplined,
and honorable occupation. These qualities distinguish professionals from others
whose limitations on conduct are largely prescribed only by general legal stan-
dards and sanctions, whether civil or criminal .... The history and purpose of the
legal profession and the professional associations supports the view that the pro-
fession is not included within the terms "business or trade" as used in section 340
of the General Business Law.
Id. at 7-8, 311 N.E.2d at 483, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40 (emphasis added). Thus, it can be
inferred that the Freeman court considered any learned profession with a rigorous sys-
tem of self-regulation to be exempt from the Donnelly Act.
The exemption announced in Freeman is not absolute. The language that "con-
certed conduct to produce as a primary purpose a certain minimum financial reward
would be unprofessional," id. at 11, 311 N.E.2d at 485, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 342, indicates
that if members of the learned professions act in concert to promote their own economic
self-interest, then they should not be allowed to avoid liability under the Donnelly Act
by using their professional status as a defense.
28. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). For a full discussion of the Goldfarb decision see Stiehl,
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: Legal Ethics and the Search for Homeostasis in Anti-
trust Law, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 699 (1977).
29. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 778.
30. In ruling that the minimum fee schedule was a restraint on competition, the
Court emphasized the fact that title examinations are indispensable in financing real
estate purchases. Since only an attorney licensed to practice in Virginia could legally
examine titles, the Court reasoned that consumers could not turn to alternative sources
for the necessary service. Id. at 782-83.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/4
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regulation for the learned professions s and implicitly recognized
a limited learned professions exemption.3 2 Since Goldfarb, fed-
eral courts have been inclined to bring the learned professions
within the scope of the Sherman Act.38 For example, in Ballard
v. Blue Shield of Southern West Virginia, Inc.,4 the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the professional status of physicians alone did
not exempt them from the Sherman Act. 5 Specifically, the de-
fendant physicians, together with a medical association that sold
health insurance, engaged in a group boycott designed to deny
health insurance coverage for chiropractic services.3 8 The Fourth
Circuit held that such a boycott violated the Sherman Act. 7
In New York, the only case after Freeman which has ad-
dressed the issue of the learned professions exemption is People
v. Roth.8 Despite Goldfarb and its progeny,3 the Roth court an-
nounced a blanket exemption from liability under the Donnelly
Act for the medical profession. 0
31. The Supreme Court in Goldfarb stated, in response to the Virginia State Bar
Association's contention that the learned professions should be granted a total exclusion
from the antitrust laws, that Congress did not intend any such sweeping exclusion. Id. at
787.
32. The Goldfarb Court noted:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of profes-
sions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply
to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently.
Id. at 788-89 n. 17.
33. In National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), the
Court held that the Society's canon of ethics prohibiting its members from submitting
competitive bids for engineering services violated section one of the Sherman Act. Id. at
686-96. In Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977), the
Ninth Circuit held that the membership requirements of the American Dental Associa-
tion and its constituent societies were not beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. Id. at
628-30.
34. 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976).
35. Id. at 1079.
36. Id. at 1077-79.
37. Id. at 1079.
38. 52 N.Y.2d 440, 420 N.E.2d 929, 438 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1981).
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 447, 420 NE.2d at 930, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
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III. Counterpart Conformity
The Donnelly Act was revised in 1957. Today's Statute is
essentially the product of that revision which was based on a
special committee report by the New York State Bar Associa-
tion." That report clearly indicates that it was the intention of
the committee that the Donnelly Act be considered the counter-
part of the Sherman Act and that interpretations of the Don-
nelly Act be consistent with both federal antitrust principles as
they existed in 1957, as well as future interpretations of the
Sherman Act.4
2
In Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products, Inc.,' the
New York Court of Appeals considered the Donnelly Act a vir-
tual copy of the Sherman Act and followed federal antitrust pol-
icy in reaching its decision to prohibit the resolution of New
York antitrust controversies through commercial arbitration."
In State v. Mobil Oil Corp.,4 the court of appeals looked again
to federal antitrust law. Reasoning that price discrimination in
the federal antitrust field was covered not by the Sherman Act,
but rather by legislation supplemental to the Sherman Act, the
41. N.Y.S. BAR Ass'N ANTITRUST SEcMoN, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE To
STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTTRUST LAWS (1957) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL CoMMnmEr
REPORT]. The legislation recommended by this committee was approved by Governor
Averell Harriman on April 24, 1957. See 1957 N.Y. Laws at 1881-82.
42. In considering proposed changes in the Donnelly Act the special committee
wrote:
The changes which we advocate are designed merely to simplify and not to
alter in any respect the coverage and meaning of the statute save to make clear
that it relates to all subjects of commerce, or in other words, that it embraces the
same economic activities as the Sherman Act.
SPECIAL CoMMrrrns REPORT, supra note 41, at 10 (emphasis in original).
In considering the substantive adequacy of the Donnelly Act the special committee
wrote:
The Donnelly Act has been on the books for close to sixty years and the sub-
stitution of Sherman law wording would produce more confusion than it would
allay. Moreover, the state decisions seem to rest on the same fundamental con-
cepts as does the federal law, and the differences between state and federal juris-
prudence are insubstantial. In the few instances where the state law seems to di-
verge from federal, the state decisions are often generations old. Should the same
issues arise again, they would presumably be decided in the light of modern anti-
trust concepts which have been developed federally.
SPECIAL COMMrrTE REPORT, supra note 41, at &
43. 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
44. Id. at 626, 237 N.E.2d at 225, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
45. 38 N.Y.2d 460, 344 N.E.2d 357, 381 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1976).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/4
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court held that the Donnelly Act does not extend to price
discrimination."
IV. People v. Roth
The defendant physicians in Roth were authorized by the
Workers' Compensation Board to treat workers injured during
the course of their employment.'7 Fees for treating such patients
were governed by a fee schedule adopted by the compensation
board.48 New York's No-Fault Insurance Law4' adopted the
same fee schedule;50 thus, the compensation board's fee schedule
also governed fees awarded to physicians who treated persons
injured in automobile accidents. 51 After becoming dissatisfied
with the compensation board, the defendant physicians organ-
ized the Surgical Specialties Association of New York, Inc. 2 The
purpose behind the organization of the SSANY was to urge the
legislature to modify the compensation fee schedule and to elim-
inate the system's abuses.5 The defendants, unsuccessful in
their attempt to obtain legislative action, concertedly agreed to
resign their authorizations to treat work-related or automobile
accident-related injuries." Eventually, over 250 physicians in
the area became unavailable to provide nonemergency medical
aid to workers and accident victims.55
46. The Mobil court stated:
Price discrimination... is not and never has been within the purview of the
Sherman Act. By the adoption of the Clayton Act in 1914 the Congress sought by
supplementing the Sherman Act to prohibit price discrimination in specified cir-
cumstances .... In 1936 the Clayton Act was amended in turn by the Robinson-
Patman Act (49 U.S. Stat. 1526, now U.S. Code, tit. 15, section 13), inter alia, to
provide comprehensive Federal regulation of price discrimination. It is clear to us
that reference to the history of and practice under the Federal antitrust laws dem-
onstrates that if our Donnelly Act is to be considered a counterpart of the Sher-
man Act it does not extend to price discrimination as such.
State v. Mobil Oil Corp., 38 N.Y.2d at 463, 344 N.E.2d at 359, 381 N.Y.S. 2d at 428
(citation omitted).
47. People v. Roth, 100 Misc. 2d at 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
48. Id.
49. N.Y. INs. LAw § 678 (McKinney 1977).
50. People v. Roth, 100 Misc. 2d at 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
51. Id.
52. Id. [hereinafter the SSANY].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 543-44, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
1982]
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The indictment against the defendant physicians was the
result of an investigation undertaken by the New York Attor-
ney-General's Office after it learned of numerous complaints
from residents who were refused nonemergency medical ser-
vices.56 Specifically, the indictment charged the defendant phy-
sicians with "concertedly resigning their authorizations to treat
non-emergency Workers' Compensation patients, and con-
certedly refusing to treat non-emergency No-Fault patients. '57
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
indictment.58 The appellate division and the court of appeals
affirmed58
V. Decision of the Court
The New York Court of Appeals faced the issue whether the
medical profession should be exempt from the Donnelly Act. In
deciding that the medical profession does not fall within the
scope of the Donnelly Act, the majority emphasized the Free-
man rule60 which exempts, almost totally, the learned profes-
sions from liability under the Act. 1 The Roth majority mini-
mized the importance of Goldfarb by stating that it was a
federal court ruling interpreting a federal statute.2 The majority
reasoned that such a ruling has no direct bearing on a state
court's analysis of an analogous provision enacted by the state
legislature.68
Although the majority did not address directly the issue of
counterpart conformity, it said an argument could be made that
the Donnelly Act should be reexamined in light of Goldfarb."
The majority found this argument untenable, 5 stating that the
56. Id. at 544, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
57. Id. at 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
58. Id. at 547, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
59. See supra note 2.
60. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 447, 420 N.E.2d at 929, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
61. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
62. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 447-48, 420 N.E.2d at 930, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
63. The Roth court stated. "As we noted in Freeman, the ruling of a Federal court
interpreting a Federal statute has no direct bearing upon a State court's analysis of an
analogous provision enacted by the State legislature .... Id. at 447, 420 N.E.2d at 930,
438 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
64. Id. at 448, 420 N.E.2d at 930, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
65. Id.
[Vol. 2:273
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Freeman rule should not be abandoned merely because a federal
court had reached a different conclusion about an analogous fed-
eral statute."
Judge Jones's concurrence stated that, through counterpart
conformity, the medical profession falls within the scope of the
Donnelly Act, but that the indictment against the defendant
physicians should have been dismissed on constitutional
grounds . 7 First, in regard to counterpart conformity, Judge
Jones relied heavily on the special committee reporta which
contains a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the
1957 revision of the Donnelly Act. He reasoned that the commit-
tee's report discloses a legislative intent to have the New York
courts interpret the Donnelly Act in accordance with federal
court interpretations of the Sherman Act.' Since Freeman,
which granted the learned professions an almost total exemption
from liability under the Donnelly Act, is inconsistent with Gold-
farb, which announced that the learned professions are not enti-
tled to such a broad exemption under the Sherman Act, Judge
Jones reasoned that the principle of counterpart conformity
compelled the overruling of Freeman.70
Judge Jones stated that the indictment against the defen-
dants should have been dismissed on constitutional grounds and
not on the Freeman rule.7 1 He asserted that holding the Don-
nelly Act applicable to the defendants would have violated the
fair warning requirement announced by the Supreme Court in
Bouie v. City of Columbia.7 2 Under this fair warning require-
ment, "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct
it makes a crime .... , In Roth, the defendant physicians be-
66. The Roth court stated: "[W]e can see no sound reason to abandon the Freeman
rule merely because a Federal court has reached a different conclusion about an analo-
gous Federal statute... ." Id.
67. Id. at 448-53, 420 N.E.2d at 930-33, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 73841 (Jones, J.,
concurring).
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
69. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 448-50, 420 N.E.2d at 930-31, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 738-
39 (Jones, J., concurring).
70. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 451-52, 420 N.E.2d at 932, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 740
(Jones, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 452, 420 N.E.2d at 933, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (Jones, J., concurring).
72. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
73. Id. at 350-51. In Bouie, the petitioners, a group of blacks, entered a drugstore,
which extended service to blacks at all departments except the restaurant department,
1982]
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lieved - due to the Freeman court's interpretation of the Don-
nelly Act - that the Act did not apply to them. The retroactive
application of Judge Jones's interpretation of the Donnelly Act
would have deprived them of a fair warning that they were no
longer exempt from the Act. Judge Jones concluded that such a
deprivation would be inconsistent with Bouie, and that the in-
dictment against the defendants should have been dismissed on
that constitutional ground. "'
VI. Analysis of the Decision
The acceptance by the Roth majority of the learned profes-
sions exemption announced in Freeman is in direct conflict with
the present trend in federal antitrust law denying the learned
professions an exemption.7 5 Relying on stare decisis, the major-
ity stated: "[W]e can see no sound reason to abandon the Free-
man rule merely because a Federal court has reached a different
conclusion about an analogous Federal statute ... ."" This
clearly indicates how rigidly the majority adhered to Freeman.
Yet, the majority opinion overlooked Mobi77 and Aimcee 5
and took seats in a restaurant booth without having received any notice that the depart-
ment was barred to blacks. The petitioners were asked to leave, but refused to do so and
were convicted of violating a South Carolina criminal trespass statute proscribing entry
upon the lands of another after notice prohibiting such entry. In affirming the petition-
ers' convictions, the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the statute to cover not
only the act of entry on the premises of another after receiving notice not to enter, but
also the act of remaining on the premises of another after receiving notice to leave. The
United States Supreme Court held that the South Carolina Supreme Court, by giving
retroactive application to its new construction of the statute, had deprived petitioners of
their right to a fair warning of a criminal prohibition, and had thus violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 348-63. The holding in Bouie applies
to cases involving the Donnelly Act since that Act imposes criminal penalties for viola-
tions of it. Specifically, section 341 of the Donnelly Act provides:
Every person or corporation . . . who shall make ... any such contract,
agreement, arrangement or combination .. or who shall do any act pursuant
thereto ... is guilty of a class E felony.
N.Y. GEN. Bus LAw § 341 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
74. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 452-53, 420 N.E.2d at 933, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 741
(Jones, J., concurring).
75. See supra notes 31, 33 and text accompanying notes 34-37.
76. People v. Roth, 52 N.Y.2d at 448, 420 N.E.2d at 930, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
77. State v. Mobil Oil Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 460, 344 N.E.2d 357, 381 N.Y.S.2d 426
(1976).
78. Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223,
289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/4
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which - as Judge Jones mentioned in his concurring opinion -
recognize the principle of counterpart conformity requiring the
court to look to federal antitrust law when interpreting the Don-
nelly Act.79 As the opinion of Judge Jones is based on a thor-
ough analysis of the applicable law, it is the stronger and better
reasoned opinion.
It could be contended, as the majority in Roth pointed out,
that Goldfarb has no effect in New York since a state court is
the ultimate arbiter of its own law. The use of counterpart con-
formity by the New York Court of Appeals in Mobil and
Aimcee, and the legislative history80 of the present Donnelly
Act, make it clear, however, that the Roth court could just as
easily have decided not to exempt the medical profession from
the Donnelly Act. The majority could have pointed to Ballard,81
which, like Roth, involved a group boycott by physicians. Since
the Fourth Circuit, in Ballard, brought the defendant physicians
within the scope of the Sherman Act, the New York Court of
Appeals, using counterpart conformity, could have brought the
defendant physicians in Roth within the scope of the Donnelly
Act.
A close reading of the Freeman decision reveals the lan-
guage that "concerted conduct to produce as a primary purpose
a certain minimum financial reward would be unprofessional. ' '8 2
This language amounts to an unprofessional conduct exception
to Freeman's general rule that learned professionals are exempt
from liability under the Donnelly Act. The defendant physi-
cians' behavior in Roth clearly comes under this exception to
Freeman since their concerted refusal to provide services was
aimed at protesting low fee schedules and, thus, advancing their
own economic self-interest. Therefore, under this analysis, the
defendant physicians in Roth should have been held subject to
the Donnelly Act.
The reason the Roth majority failed to use this analysis is
that it considered the Freeman learned professions exemption a
blanket exemption, precluding an examination of the defendant
79. See supra note 46 and text accompanying notes 43-46.
80. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
81. Ballard v. Blue Shield of S. W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976).
82. In re Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d at 11, 311 N.E.2d at 485, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
1982]
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physicians' behavior. The quoted exception to Freeman, how-
ever, clearly indicates that, under Freeman, the behavior of the
defendant learned professionals must be examined to determine
whether they acted unprofessionally. The Roth court, therefore,
should not have granted the defendant physicians a blanket ex-
emption simply because they happened to be members of a
learned profession.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is readily apparent that the
reasoning of the Roth court is faulty for two reasons. First, by
rejecting Goldfarb, the Roth court turned its back on the current
view of the relationship between the learned professions and the
antitrust laws. Second, by considering the Freeman learned pro-
fessions exemption a blanket exemption, the Roth court manu-
factured a rule it could rely on to exempt the defendant physi-
cians. It is dangerous to impute a motive to a court; however, it
is this author's opinion that the Roth court exempted the defen-
dant physicians simply because it wanted to do so.
VII. Conclusion
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Roth, held
that physicians are totally exempt from New York's principal
antitrust legislation, the Donnelly Act. This is a departure from
federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act, under which physicians
and other learned professionals are not totally exempt from lia-
bility. Prior decisions by the New York Court of Appeals and
the legislative history of the Donnelly Act indicate that interpre-
tations of the Donnelly Act should be consistent with interpreta-
tions of the Sherman Act. Therefore, under the principle of
counterpart conformity, the defendant physicians in Roth
should not have been exempted from the Donnelly Act.
Further, the defendant physicians in Roth should have been
held subject to the Donnelly Act under the exception to Free-
man condemning as unprofessional concerted conduct with the
primary purpose of financial reward. The concerted activity of
these physicians, designed to advance their own economic self-
interest, was clearly unprofessional. Therefore, they should not
have prevailed by using their professional status as a defense.
Dean A. Cambourakis
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